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I. INTRODUCTION 
When people book vacations on cruise ships they envision the fun 
they will have snorkeling, sightseeing and exploring the beaches.  
Recently, however, the media and public advocates have begun to 
scrutinize cruise ships for several reasons.  A quick internet search will 
turn up a plethora of public outcry demanding cruise lines fix problems 
that passengers unknowingly face every time they go aboard a cruise ship.1  
                                                                                                                                     
† J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Business and 
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When buying tickets, outbreaks of norovirus or sustaining a serious injury 
are far from the mind of most passengers.2  These issues are quite 
prevalent, however, and vacationers should be able to rely on the ship’s 
infirmary to prevent the spread of serious illnesses and treat injuries. 
Absent the minds of most passengers, cruise ship companies are 
bound almost exclusively by nineteenth century maritime law which 
differs significantly from the common and statutory law governing land-
based torts.3  In what has become known as the “Barbetta rule,” passengers 
are barred from bringing a medical malpractice lawsuit against a cruise 
ship company for injuries suffered at the hands of medical physicians in 
the ship’s infirmary.4  Unlike hospitals which can be held vicariously 
liable for a doctor’s medical negligence, the Barbetta rule reflects the long 
standing admiralty and maritime tradition that ship owners should not be 
held vicariously liable for medical negligence occurring within the 
infirmary because physicians are aboard the ship merely for the 
convenience of passengers and cannot control the patient’s treatment.5  
Under this logic, a cruise ship company bears no responsibility for onboard 
medical negligence despite the infirmary being the only medical facility 
passengers can access while at sea. 
                                                                                                                                     
difficult stages in writing this Comment.  Finally, I would like to thank my family and 
friends for the love and support that made all of my success possible. 
 1 Seth Cline, The 8 Worst Cruise Ship Disasters, U.S. NEWS, (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/14/the-eight-worst-cruise-ship-disasters; 
see also Meredith Galante, 10 Other Horrifying Cruise Ship Disasters, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/costa-concordia-cruise-ship-disasters-
2012-1. 
 2 Centers for Disease Control and Protection, Vessel Sanitation Program: Facts About 
Noroviruses on Cruise Ships, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/vsp/pub/norovirus/norovirus.htm 
(last updated Aug. 5, 2013) (providing facts regarding contagious noroviruses which spread 
easy aboard cruise ships where many people are in close quarters). 
 3 Thomas A. Dickerson & Jeffrey A. Cohen, Medical Malpractice on the High Seas, 
N.Y. L. J. 1 (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCert_pdfs/ Dickerson 
_Docs/medicalmalpractice.pdf (“[P]assengers may travel on 21st-century cruise ships, but 
their rights and remedies for injuries sustained on or off the cruise ship are governed, in 
many cases, by 19th-century legal principles.”). 
 4 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 5 Compare Bercel v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 24–25 (Tex. 
1994) (a patient may bring a negligence claim against a mental hospital despite the treating 
psychiatrist’s status as an independent contractor because the hospital was required by 
statute to ensure patients received “adequate medical and psychiatric care and treatment”), 
and Blanton v. Moses Cone Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457–59 (N.C. 1987) (a patient may 
allege that a hospital is vicariously liable for the malpractice committed by the treating 
doctor even though the doctor was not the hospital’s agent because based on ordinary 
negligence at common law, a reasonably prudent hospital would have found it necessary 
to ascertain the doctor’s qualifications prior to allowing him to perform surgery), with 
Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988), and O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 
266, 266–67 (Mass. 1891). 
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The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently taken a stand against the 
Barbetta rule’s applicability to cruise ships in one of its latest decisions, 
Franza v. Royal Caribbean.6  The Eleventh Circuit created a split between 
the circuit courts by holding in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, which was the last case agreeing 
with the maritime tradition and gave it a name – the Barbetta Rule.7 
The intention of this Article is not to analyze possible reasons for the 
validity of such a rule.  Rather, this Article brings to light a newly-created 
circuit split and suggests a solution based on a thorough analysis of the 
issue.  One of the questions this Article addresses is: how a hospital may 
be held vicariously liable for medical malpractice committed by doctors, 
but yet a cruise ship is usually exempt from the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for identical medical malpractice claims? And in doing so, this 
Article argues for the adoption of a uniform rule that dismisses the logic 
behind applying the Barbetta rule to today’s cruise ships.  By using the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Franza as the initial framework, this Article 
offers a modern rule allowing passengers injured by onboard medical 
malpractice to bring a claim against a cruise ship company.  Only once 
such suggestions are implemented uniformly will medical patients aboard 
cruise ships receive the same protections afforded to patients treated at 
healthcare facilities on land. 
To develop a solution, the roots of maritime law must be examined 
to interpret the complexities that make an easy solution to this problem 
almost impossible.  Part II of this Article offers a detailed synopsis of the 
origins of maritime law that provides the basis for the Barbetta rule.  An 
understanding reveals that, in some respects, maritime law has drifted 
away from other bodies of law.  Part III addresses the circuit split at the 
core of this Article.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta relied on 
traditional maritime law to deny a vacationer the ability to bring a claim 
alleging medical malpractice against the carrier cruise line.8  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s ruling finds that a passenger may bring a claim against a cruise 
ship owner for medical malpractice committed by the carrier’s employed 
physician aboard the ship.9  Part IV analyzes the circuit split between the 
Fifth and Eleventh circuits and articulates possible solutions by analyzing 
traditional maritime law in the context of the modern cruise vacation 
industry.  Lastly, this Article concludes by arguing that the other circuit 
courts should adopt the Eleven Circuit’s conclusion.  Not only does the 
proposed solution provide fairness, but based on the circumstances of 
                                                                                                                                     
 6 Franza v. Royal Caribbean, 772 F.3d 1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 7 Id.; Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367, 1369–70. 
 8 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367, 1369–70. 
 9 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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present day maritime law, it is no longer appropriate to apply century old 
law to modern medical malpractice claims. 
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE BARBETTA RULE 
A. Maritime and Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Maritime and admiralty law is its own body of law with original 
jurisdiction to hear such cases residing with the federal judiciary.10  The 
Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases . . . of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”11  This means that the 
federal courts will typically have original jurisdiction to hear any issue 
regarding admiralty and maritime law.  But what matters constitute 
admiralty or maritime?  Moreover, what substantive laws are federal 
courts to apply to maritime and admiralty lawsuits? 
Pre-twentieth century cases defining the scope of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction provided that such jurisdiction exists when the 
wrong occurs on “navigable waters.”12  Over time, however, this simple 
distinction became murky as cases arose in which the wrong originated on 
land, but was later suffered on the water, or vice versa.13  To resolve this 
problem, the Supreme Court touched upon the test for determining 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by stating that not only must the wrong 
occur on navigable waters, but must also bear a “maritime nexus – some 
relationship between the tort and traditional maritime activities[.]”14  As it 
relates to the issue at hand, onboard medical malpractice is a tort that bears 
a maritime nexus to maritime activities and, therefore, is within the 
maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. 
The federal judiciary has explained that “with admiralty jurisdiction 
comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”15  Without relevant 
legislation from Congress, the federal judiciary is to impose general 
maritime case law.16  The general maritime law is defined as “an amalgam 
of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, 
modifications of those rules, and newly created rules” specifically tailored 
to the admiralty and maritime industry.17  This explains the difference 
                                                                                                                                     
 10 U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 34–36 (1866). 
 13 See e.g., Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933); Hess v. United States, 
259 F.2d 285, 289–90 (9th Cir. 1958); Chapman v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 
963–64 (1967). 
 14 Exec. Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 256 (1972). 
 15 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 864–65. 
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between medical malpractice claims brought against a hospital versus a 
cruise ship company.  While a patient’s ability to bring a medical 
malpractice suit against a hospital has been codified by statute and 
recognized by case law, no statute allows for a passenger to initiate a 
lawsuit against a ship owner for medical negligence.18  Moreover, the 
relevant case law holds to the contrary by barring claims against the ship 
owner for onboard medical negligence because a treating physician was 
brought aboard for the convenience of the passengers and the ship owner 
does not have any control over the treatment received by the claimant-
passenger.19 
B. Evolution of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against Hospitals and 
Medical Centers 
The sharp distinction between hospitals and ship infirmaries did not 
always exist.  In fact, hospitals and related medical centers once benefitted 
from a broad protection from the doctrine of respondeat superior in part 
due to the “charitable immunity doctrine” 20 which was applied in a similar 
fashion to the Barbetta rule. 
American hospitals were traditionally exempt from vicarious 
liability arising from a doctor’s medical negligence.21  Hospitals were 
predominately charitable institutions financed by religious organizations 
and the philanthropy of the wealthy.22  The premise of the charitable 
immunity doctrine was that hospitals should not be liable for negligent 
treatment rendered by a doctor because these facilities were established 
merely to help the sick and insane rather than profiting off attempts to cure 
and prevent disease.23 
Additionally, looking back to the 1800s, case law on this issue was 
sparse because only a small percentage of physicians treated patients in 
hospitals.24  Typically, doctors would visit, and even perform surgery, on 
patients within their homes.25  As a result, identical to the Barbetta rule, 
                                                                                                                                     
 18 Robert D. Peltz, Has Time Passed Barbetta By?, 25 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2011) 
(discussing guidelines that cruise ships adhere to, but noting the lack of regulations or 
applicable laws aimed at protecting vacationers who seek onboard treatment). 
 19 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien 
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 
(9th Cir. 1918). 
 20 See Roger N Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding 
the Evolution – Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 675, 677 (1998). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 678, 681; see also McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
 24 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677. 
 25 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677–78. 
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the charitable immunity doctrine took form and shielded hospitals from 
vicarious liability arising out of a doctor’s negligence.26 
At the turn of the twentieth century, advancements in medical 
technology and the health care system spurred reformations of these 
traditions.27  Hospitals were no longer considered secondary or lower-class 
institutions for health care because the convenience of modern equipment 
and a central staff attracted many doctors, drawing them away from 
making house calls.28  Over time, health care institutions became an 
accepted place to perform operations and evaluate patients.  Even wealthy 
patients who once preferred the comfort of their homes began to embrace 
the centralization that hospitals were now able to provide.29 
Gradually, heath care institutions grew from merger facilities reliant 
on charity into complex medical centers focused primarily on 
profitability.30  The control of hospitals began to transfer from the hands 
of religious organizations and good Samaritans to the medical physicians 
themselves or a board of directors.31  This conflict resulted in the erosion 
of the charitable immunity doctrine as it became unequitable to shield 
hospitals from vicarious liability while allowing such institutions to profit 
from treatment rendered by their physicians.32 
The medical malpractice system we are all accustomed to developed 
from this evolution, and is premised on three primary justifications: 
society finds it appropriate for an innocent victim to recover from the 
negligent individual who caused the victim’s injury or loss; the innocent 
victim should not be “rendered destitute, and socially unproductive” 
because of a lack of financial means to remediate the injuries sustained’ 
and to serve as a deterrent effect for health care professionals and 
providers to ensure proper services will be rendered in the future.33  To 
accomplish these justifications, those who have suffered injuries or loss 
due to a physician’s medical negligence may hold the professional as well 
as the health care provider vicariously liable for the claimant’s damages 
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.34  Medical providers could 
                                                                                                                                     
 26 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678. 
 27 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677–78. 
 28 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678. 
 29 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678, (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 32 (3d ed. 1997)). 
 30 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 681. 
 31 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 679. 
 32 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 679. 
 33 John Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability and 
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 307–309 (2001). 
 34 Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusion into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice, 
Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 946–47 
(1984). 
2016] Are Cruise Ships Liable for On-Board Medical Malpractice? 321 
be held vicariously liable on the basis of apparent agency.35  Accordingly, 
courts began to utilize judicial-made tests to chip away at the charitable 
immunity doctrine by establishing a hospital’s liability for a physician’s 
negligence.36 
C. Development of the Barbetta rule 
New York federal court presided over one of the first cases 
contributing to the development of the Barbetta rule.  In Laubheim v. De 
Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoomboot Maatschappy, a passenger aboard 
a steamship from Rotterdam to New York fell and severely injured her 
knee.37  The passenger was escorted to the vessel’s surgeon, an employee 
of the steamboat company.38  The injured passenger subsequently sued the 
steamboat company alleging that the surgeon’s treatment was so poor that 
her leg had to be amputated once she arrived in New York.39 
The court stated that when a ship owner or carrier hires a surgeon, 
the owner or carrier has a duty to ensure the surgeon is “reasonably 
competent.”40  Thus, a ship owner or carrier can only be liable if it fails to 
hire a “reasonably competent” medical professional.41  Since the 
steamboat company exercised reasonable care and diligence in hiring its 
surgeon, the company was not liable for any negligent medical treatment 
the passenger claimed to have received onboard the steamboat.42 
This shield from vicarious liability was further discussed in O’Brien 
v. Cunard.43  In O’Brien, all passengers were required by law to receive a 
vaccination prior to landing in Massachusetts.44  Accordingly, the carrier 
employed a medical physician to administer the vaccination to all 
passengers before the vessel reached its final destination.45  One passenger 
sued the carrier after arriving in Massachusetts, arguing that she was 
negligently vaccinated by the physician while aboard the vessel.46 
The court reiterated that once a carrier decides to bring aboard a 
physician, the carrier undertakes the duty to ensure the medical 
professional hired is competent to perform all tasks reasonably expected 
                                                                                                                                     
 35 Id. 
 36 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 680. 
 37 Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 266–67. 
 46 Id. at 266. 
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of a physician aboard a ship for such a voyage.47  Because the carrier 
satisfied its obligation to employ a competent doctor, the carrier was not 
vicariously liable for any negligence committed by the physician in 
performing the medical services he was employed by the carrier to 
provide.48  Further, the court articulated that: 
 
[t]he law does not put the business of treating sick 
passengers into the charge of common carriers, and make 
them responsible for the proper management of it.  The 
work which the physician or surgeon does in such cases 
is under the control of the passengers themselves.  It is 
their business, not the business of the carrier . . . owners 
of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical 
officer when he attends [to] a passenger.49 
 
From this holding, the federal judiciary formulated the law that will 
eventually be termed the Barbetta rule.50  The ship owner or carrier’s duty 
is merely to ensure it employs a reasonably competent and qualified 
medical physician and supplies the professional with the equipment 
necessary to properly treat those onboard.51  Once the ship owner or carrier 
has fulfilled these obligations, a passenger cannot hold the ship’s owner or 
carrier vicariously liable for negligent treatment rendered by the physician 
because the owner cannot interfere or exercise control over the treatment.52  
Additionally, an owner is not in the business of providing medical services 
to its passengers.53  Rather, the physician is employed and brought aboard 
for the mere convenience of the passengers who may elect to seek 
treatment from the onboard medical professional(s).54  This logic was 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 Id. at 266–67. 
 48 Id. 
 49 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266. 
 50 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating 
that a cruise ship company can only be vicariously liable for an employed medical 
physician’s negligence if the company negligently hired the medical physician at fault for 
the claimant’s injuries). 
 51 See e.g., id., at 1369; The Great N., 251 F. 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1918); Di Bonaventure 
v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 103 (E.D.Penn. 1982); Branch v. Compagnie Gen. 
Transatlantique, 11 F. Supp. 832, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 
159–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891); Laubheim 
v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887). 
 52 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; see also Churchill v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400 (D. Mass. 
1923); accord The Great N., 251 F. at 831. 
 53 Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see 
also O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; Di Bonaventure, 536 F.Supp. at 103. 
 54 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267. 
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carried into the twentieth century where it was strengthened by subsequent 
cases brought by passengers seeking ship owners be held vicariously liable 
for onboard medical malpractice committed by the medical professional(s) 
hired to administer treatment aboard the ship.55 
III. THE BARBETTA RULE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star 
extended this maritime shield to the cruise line industry by holding that 
precedent establishes that passengers are barred from bringing a claim 
against a cruise ship company’s negligent treatment rendered on cruise 
ships.56  In Barbetta, a married couple vacationing in Mexico sued the 
cruise ship after the onboard doctor failed to discover that Mrs. Barbetta 
had diabetes while treating her.57  In July of 1986, Mr. and Mrs. James and 
Florence Barbetta (collectively the “Barbettas”) filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the cruise 
ship - the S.S. Bermuda Star (the “Bermuda Star”), the owner of the 
Bermuda Star, and the company that chartered and operated the vacation.58 
The Barbettas were vacationers aboard the Bermuda Star for a cruise 
that departed from New Orleans and made stops in Florida and various 
ports in Mexico.59  Shortly after the Bermuda Star departed from New 
Orleans, Mrs. Barbetta became ill and sought the assistance of the medical 
staff aboard the ship the following morning.60  Mrs. Barbetta was treated 
aboard the Bermuda Star from January 26 until January 31.61  During that 
time, Mrs. Barbetta’s condition continued to worsen. 62  She was finally 
transported from the Bermuda Star on January 31 to a hospital after she 
developed severe pneumonia and fell into a coma.63 
The Barbettas sued the ship and its management for “[medical] 
malpractice, neglect, carelessness, and negligence” committed by the 
medical staff that treated Mrs. Barbetta aboard the Bermuda Star.64  The 
Barbettas claimed that Mrs. Barbetta was originally suffering from a Type-
A diabetes condition and the medical staff’s failure to properly diagnose 
                                                                                                                                     
 55 See The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); Churchill, 294 F. at 
400. 
 56 Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1367, 1369–70. (5th Cir. 1988). 
 57 Id. at 1365. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1366. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1366. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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the illness resulted in the significant deterioration of her health.65  The 
Barbettas claimed to have incurred $1,000,000 in damages which included 
medical treatment, pain and suffering, lost wages, loss of consortium and 
loss of service, society, and support as a result of the ordeal aboard the 
Bermuda Star. 66  The Barbetta’s further alleged that the Bermuda Star, its 
owners and management were liable because they failed in their obligation 
to employ competent medical professionals and that the malpractice 
occurred during the course and scope of employment rendering the named 
defendants vicariously liable for the negligent medical treatment Mrs. 
Barbetta received.67 
In a matter of first impression, the District Court stated that a carrier 
company is not vicariously liable in instances where the ship’s doctor 
negligently treats a passenger.68  The court reasoned that under maritime 
law, the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot apply to a carrier vessel 
because there is no obligation to employ an onboard medical 
professional.69  The court further reasoned that holding such parties liable 
would result in carrier vessels refusing to bring doctors aboard a ship 
entirely rather than to supply medical treatment as an added convenience 
to passengers.70  Additionally, the ticket the Barbettas purchased contained 
a contract with a disclaimer provision that made it clear that the doctor 
aboard was not a “servant or agent” of the Bermuda Star, and that the 
company would not be liable for the doctor’s malpractice.71  The District 
Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of all named 
defendants.72  The Fifth Circuit subsequently took the case on appeal to 
determine the issue of whether the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes 
liability on the cruise ship company if a doctor employed by the company 
renders negligent treatment to a passenger. 73 
The Fifth Circuit relied upon the longstanding maritime principle that 
if a carrier employs a doctor, it is done for the convenience of the 
passengers and the carrier must only ensure that the doctor is competent 
and duly qualified.74  But in either instance, a doctor’s negligence in 
treating a passenger does not fall on the carrier.75  The Barbettas’ claim 
                                                                                                                                     
 65 Id. (alleging that had the doctor properly diagnosed Mrs. Barbetta’s condition she 
would never have suffered from the later incurred medical emergencies). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1367–68. 
 73 Id. at 1368, 1372. 
 74 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369 (internal citations omitted). 
 75 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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was determined to conflict with general maritime principles  which explain 
that a medical physician carried aboard is present only for a passenger’s 
mere convenience.76  Carriers are not bound by respondeat superior 
because the ship owner or management of the carrier lack any meaningful 
control over the doctor that would otherwise demonstrate the medical staff 
aboard is the “servant or agent” of the carrier.77  The mere presence of a 
doctor aboard a ship hired by the carrier for passengers’ convenience does 
not equate to vicarious liability.78 
The Fifth Circuit in Barbetta acknowledged the lone case endorsing 
the only conflicting view and then immediately dismissed it.79  In Nietes 
v. American President Lines, Ltd.,80 a California District Court opined that 
a vessel’s medical physician that collects a salary from the carrier, is 
regularly employed, and subject to the rules of the carrier and the owners’ 
demands is presumed to be an ordinary employee.81  Accordingly, the 
carrier is vicariously liable for any malpractice or negligence committed 
by the onboard physician.82  The Nietes court reasoned that the carrier’s 
ability to exercise control over the treatment methods rendered by an 
onboard medical professional is an unreasonable basis for refusing to hold 
the carrier liable for the physician’s negligent treatment rendered to a 
passenger.83 
The Fifth Circuit stated that the Nietes Court misunderstood 
respondeat superior liability by misinterpreting the carrier’s control over 
the doctor’s general actions versus the requirement to control the doctor’s 
treatment methods.84  In the context of maritime law, the carrier or ship 
owner lacks “the expertise to meaningfully evaluate, and therefore, control 
a doctor’s treatment of his patients and the power, even if it has 
knowledge, to intrude into the physician-patient relationship.”85 
The Fifth Circuit made one concession in the Barbetta decision.86  
The court stated that while a carrier does not have an obligation to provide 
medical personnel for passengers, the carrier does have the responsibility 
of exercising “reasonable care to furnish such aid and assistance as 
                                                                                                                                     
 76 Id. (citing O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891)). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 1370–71. 
 79 See id. 
 80 Nietes v. Am., President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
 81 Id. at 220. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 220–21. 
 84 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1370–71. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (citing 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES §39 (3d ed. 
1975)). 
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ordinarily prudent persons would render under similar circumstances.”87  
But simply put, bringing aboard a doctor does not create a duty on the 
carrier pursuant to respondeat superior.88 
A. The Logic Behind the Fifth Circuit’s Decision: Summing up the 
Barbetta Rule 
To clarify, the issue at hand is governed by maritime common law 
because these are tort actions claimed to have occurred while in navigable 
waters.89  Maritime law and an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions and 
circuits have “establish[ed] that a cruise line cannot be held vicariously 
liable for the negligence of its ship’s doctor in the care and treatment of 
passengers.”90  If and when a carrier opts to bring a doctor aboard for its 
passengers, the carrier has the obligation of ensuring the doctor is 
“competent and duly qualified.”91  The carrier’s duty is satisfied when the 
carrier is deemed to have diligently inquired into the competency of the 
doctor.92  If the carrier breaches this duty, it is responsible only for its own 
negligence; never the negligence of the doctor.93  Under maritime 
principles, the carrier’s only responsibility is to guarantee that an 
employed medical professional is duly qualified and is a competent 
medical physician.94 
The basis for this principle in admiralty law contains two primary 
justifications: a cruise ship does not possess the expertise to control and 
supervise the doctor when treating a passenger and that the carrier does 
not have any control over the patient-physician relationship that exists 
between the passengers and the onboard medical staff.95  Therefore, a 
passenger may bring a claim against a carrier for negligent hiring but 
cannot seek relief under the doctrine of respondeat superior for medical 
malpractice.96  The premise underlying this rationale is that there is no 
maritime law that requires a carrier to bring aboard a doctor since they are 
                                                                                                                                     
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 90 Doonan v. Carnival Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see also 
Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988); The Korea Maru, 254 
F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918). 
 91 Barbetta 848 F. 2d at 1371. 
 92 Id. at 1367–69. 
 93 Id.; see also The Great N., 251 F. 826, 826 (9th Cir. 1918). 
 94 O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (1891). 
 95 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–44 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 96 Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345–46 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
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not in the business of providing medical services.97  A ship is not a medical 
facility and a doctor aboard a carrier is an independent medical physician 
carried by the vessel for the convenience of its passengers.98  The 
passengers are free to seek medical assistance by the medical staff aboard, 
but such action does not render the carrier vicariously liable for the 
medical staff’s neglect or subsequent malpractice actions.99 
B. The Franza Decision Creating a Circuit Split 
The Eleventh Circuit recently split with the Fifth Circuit when the 
court ruled in direct opposition to the long-established maritime law and 
allowed for a cruise ship passenger to bring claims against the carrier for 
malpractice and negligence.100  In Franza, Pasquale Vaglio (“Vaglio”), a 
passenger aboard a Royal Caribbean cruise ship, fell and suffered a serious 
head injury while docked at the port in Bermuda.101  Vaglio was 
subsequently taken to the infirmary aboard the ship.102  A nurse evaluated 
Vaglio and found no further treatment was necessary.103  As they returned 
to their cabin, the nurse informed Vaglio’s wife and family to be alert 
because there was a chance Vaglio had sustained a concussion.104 
Two hours later, Vaglio’s family called 911 while aboard the ship 
explaining that Vaglio’s health had been deteriorating since leaving the 
infirmary.105  The emergency team aboard was slow to respond, and the 
medical staff refused to proceed without first obtaining a credit card 
number when they finally wheeled Vaglio to the infirmary for the second 
time.106  After another delay of more than an hour, the onboard doctor 
evaluated Vaglio and prepared him to be transferred to a nearby Bermuda 
                                                                                                                                     
 97 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien 
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th 
Cir. 1918). 
 98 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369. 
 99 See O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266 (holding that carrier vessels are not liable under 
respondeat superior because the treatment is under the control of the passenger rather than 
the carrier). 
 100 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 101 Id. at 1227. While there is some dispute as to where exactly Vaglio fell, it is certain 
that Vaglio fell either on a loading ramp of the ship or on the dock itself. Id. 
 102 Id. at 1229. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1229.  The expenses charged went to Royal Caribbean itself 
because the company owned the infirmary and employed those that operated it. Id.  This is 
important to note because the origins of the Barbetta rule relied on the onboard doctor 
being an independent contractor rather than an employee. Id. at 1234–35. Additionally, it 
establishes control elements central to the continued validity of the Barbetta rule. 
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hospital.107  Upon arrival, the medical staff at the hospital concluded too 
much time had lapsed and there was nothing the hospital could do for 
Vaglio’s internal injuries.108  Sadly, Vaglio was airlifted to a hospital in 
New York the following morning, where he remained in intensive care 
until his death a week later.109 
On January 10, 2013, Vaglio’s daughter, serving as the 
representative of the Estate, brought a claim against Royal Caribbean.110  
Franza argued that, under the doctrine of actual authority, Royal Caribbean 
was liable for the negligent acts of the onboard medical staff serving as 
Royal Caribbean’s agents.111  In the alternative, under apparent authority, 
Royal Caribbean was liable for having “manifested to [Vaglio] . . . that its 
medical staff . . . were acting as its employees and/or agents,” and Vaglio 
“relied to his detriment on his belief that the physician and nurse were 
direct employees or actual agents [of Royal Caribbean Cruises].”112  The 
District Court dismissed the case relying on the Barbetta rule reasoning 
that the claims were “predicated on duties of care which are not recognized 
under maritime law.”113 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that a ship-owner can be held 
vicariously liable for medical malpractice pursuant to the agency 
relationship Royal Caribbean possessed with the negligent medical 
staff.114  Accordingly, Franza’s complaint alleging Royal Caribbean was 
vicariously liable for onboard medical malpractice should not have been 
dismissed.115  The Eleventh Circuit articulated that the existence of an 
agency relationship in maritime law was a question of fact.116  The primary 
consideration in finding a carrier liable under respondeat superior is the 
carrier’s control over onboard workers as their principal.117  Thus, the 
elements Franza was required to establish were whether: “the [carrier as] 
principal acknowledge[d] the agent will work for it, the agent [manifested] 
                                                                                                                                     
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. The complaint initially contained a count of “negligent hiring, retention[,] and 
training by Royal Caribbean” but was abandoned on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Id. 
 111 Id. at 1230. 
 112 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1230. 
 113 Id. (quoting Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331 
(S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that due to established maritime principles, Franza failed to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted)). 
 114 Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1235–36 (citing Naviera Netuno S.A. v. All Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 709 
F. 2d 663, 665 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 117 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1236. 
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an acceptance of the undertaking, and control by the principal; over the 
actions of the agent [existed].”118 
Franza’s complaint sufficiently demonstrated the medical personnel 
aboard the ship were employed and paid directly by Royal Caribbean, 
hired to work aboard the ship in the infirmary that was owned and 
equipped by Royal Caribbean, wore Royal Caribbean uniforms and were 
“under the command of the ship’s superior officers.”119  The Eleventh 
Circuit determined Royal Caribbean had exclusive and total control over 
the medical professionals aboard.120  With such a relationship readily 
apparent, the Franza court concluded that adherence to the Barbetta rule 
was improper.121 
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the two prong control test relied upon 
in past decisions, including Barbetta.122  As a policy matter, medical 
professionals are expected to base treatment on their own independent 
judgment.123  Thus, Royal Caribbean’s alleged inability to control the 
doctor’s treatment did not eliminate the possibility of an agency 
relationship.124  Additionally, the carrier’s inability to intrude into a 
patient-physician relationship is not required for a carrier-doctor agency 
relationship to exist.125  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found no problem with 
treating the agency relationship between carrier and doctor the same as the 
relationship between a land-based medical services company and a 
doctor.126 
C. Pleading Requirements Post-Franza 
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit split with the Fifth 
Circuit and highlighted an additional method passengers injured by 
onboard malpractice may take: apparent authority.127  Apparent authority 
is an equitable theory that does not require claimants to establish the 
control element maritime law emphasizes before a court may appropriately 
impose vicarious liability upon the carrier.128  Therefore, apparent 
                                                                                                                                     
 118 Id. (quoting Whetstone Candy Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 351 F. 3d 1067, 1077 (11th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 119 Id. at 1237. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1238–39 (noting that courts should no longer “discern a sound basis in law for 
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 123 Franza, 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–40. 
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 126 Id. at 1241. 
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authority was recognized as the proper decision if the carrier’s conduct 
equitably prevented it from denying the existence of an agency 
relationship rather than having carrier liability contingent on the notion of 
control elements.129 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded it was improper to dismiss Franza’s 
complaint because the doctrine of apparent authority is dependent on the 
underlying facts.130  The Franza court determined that Royal Caribbean 
represented the medical staff as its agents to Vaglio. 131  These 
representations led Vaglio and his family believe he was under the care of 
competent and duly qualified Royal Caribbean doctors that were 
authorized to treat him on Royal Caribbean’s behalf, and Vaglio relied on 
those representations and subsequent beliefs to his detriment.132  For these 
reasons, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower district court’s opinion 
and allowed Franza to bring a suit against Royal Caribbean pursuant to 
respondeat superior.133 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
It can no longer be said that a medical physician comes aboard a 
cruise ship merely for the convenience of the passengers.  To a degree, 
cruise ships are required to have an infirmary operated by several qualified 
physicians.134  Almost without exception, cruise lines have agreed to 
adhere to the standards established by the American College of Emergency 
Physicians (“ACEP”).135  In their publication, the ACEP goes well beyond 
requiring cruise ships to provide a well supplied infirmary for 
passengers.136  The ACEP’s Health Care Guidelines for Cruise Ship 
Medical Facilities outlines minimum credentialing and training standards, 
and also includes medical policies and procedures that must be followed 
when treating passengers.137 
Cruise ships now use these infirmaries as an additional means of 
generating revenue.  When a passenger visits a ship’s medical center they 
                                                                                                                                     
 129 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1249–50; Huang v. Carnival Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1361 
(S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 130 Id. at 1251–52. 
 131 Id. at 1252. 
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 133 Id. 
 134 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Healthcare Guidelines for Cruise Ship 
Medical Facilities, ACEP Policy Statements, http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=29500 
(last visited April 29, 2016). 
 135 Robert D. Peltz & Gretchen M. Nelson, New Destinations for Shipboard 
Malpractice, 51 TRIAL 38, 40 (2015). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, supra note 134. 
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are charged a “reasonable fee” for medical treatment.138  Although cruise 
ship companies have refused to disclose their pricing schedules for 
treatment costs, research indicates that the costs equate to standard 
American medical bills charged by American hospitals.139  Over the 
counter medications may be offered for free in some circumstances; 
however, other cruises have been reported to charge hefty sums for 
Aspirin.140  While passengers can count on the cruise line ensuring the 
pharmacy is fully stocked, passengers should expect to pay 10 percent over 
retail at a minimum for prescription drugs.141  Passengers should not fear, 
however, because although medical expenses must be paid out of pocket 
immediately – akin to Vaglio being required to hand over a credit card 
before seeing a doctor – cruise lines even offer medical insurance serving 
as secondary coverage which will reimburse passengers for up to $10,000 
in onboard medical services.142 
The salaries paid to cruise ship physicians are significantly less than 
American doctors employed by a hospital.  The average ordinary physician 
earns $189,000.00 per year.143  Conversely, doctors working aboard cruise 
ships make around $80,000.00 less per year than doctors working in 
American hospitals.144  Simple math demonstrates that when all factors are 
equal, including prices charged for treatment, after deducting physician 
salaries it is obvious that a cruise ship’s infirmary generates large revenues 
for the cruise line.  For these reasons, it is evident cruise ships are profiting 
off of medical services and therefore it is not appropriate to allow cruise 
ships to invoke the Barbetta rule. 
The first justification supporting the Barbetta rule was that cruise 
ships bring aboard a physician merely for the convenience of passengers 
                                                                                                                                     
 138 See Royal Caribbean Int’l., Feel Right at Home: Onboard Medical Services, All 
About Cruising, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/allaboutcruising/accessibleseas/feel 
RightAtHome.do (last visited April 29, 2016). 
 139 Teresa Machan, Cruise Passengers Warned Over Medical Bills, THE TELEGRAPH 
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and are not in the business of providing medical services.145  In reality, 
modern cruise ships have pledged to be bound by the ACEP standards 
which require cruise ships to have an infirmary and several duly qualified 
physicians aboard to treat passengers.146  Most importantly, cruise ships 
are in fact in the business of providing medical services.  Treating 
passengers has become a lucrative source of additional revenues on cruise 
ships.147  The change from providing medical treatment out of generosity 
to profit-making resulted in the erosion of the charitable immunity 
doctrine.148  The justification being that since hospitals shifted their 
purpose from assisting the poor and sick to profit generating, they cannot 
seek to utilize equitable immunities employed in the past to incentivize 
goodwill.149  Thus, it is time for the rejection of the Barbetta rule because 
while physicians in the past treated passengers for convenience, cruise 
ships today provide outlined medical services for a profit. 
The second justification for the Barbetta rule – that cruise ship 
companies cannot be held vicariously liable because control over 
treatment lies solely with the physician and patient – is equally 
unconvincing.150  The Eleventh Circuit has provided a workable method 
for imposing vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
that should be adopted by the other circuits.151 
The two-prong concept of control is most important to the validity of 
the Barbetta rule: the carrier or ship owner is unable to dictate the types of 
treatment rendered and cannot interfere with a patient-physician 
relationship.152  These fundamental principles have been embedded in 
nineteenth century maritime law.153  The justification was explained in 
Barbetta: 
 
The work the physician or surgeon does . . . is under the 
control of the passengers themselves.  It is their business, 
                                                                                                                                     
 145 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 146 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, supra note 134. 
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 149 Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 33, at 307–309. 
 150 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369. 
 151 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 152 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1368 (stating that control is a prerequisite for respondeat 
superior in maritime law). 
 153 See id. (relying on O’Brien, Churchill, The Great Northern, and other relevant 
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not the business of the carrier . . . The master or owners 
of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical 
official when he attends [to] a passenger.  He is not their 
servant engaged in their business, and subject to their 
control as to his mode of treatment.154 
Emphasizing this protection from the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was inappropriate to hold “shipping 
companies” vicariously liable because the vessel is not “in the business of 
providing medical services to passengers.”155  The rationale: the lack of a 
“master-servant relationship” between the ship owner and the negligent 
physician.156 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, opted to take a favorable view of a 
line of maritime cases that focused on whether it would be “unjust and 
unreasonable” for a carrier to dodge responsibility for the negligence of its 
agents.157  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that along with the recognition 
of control, there is a long tradition in maritime mandating ship owners’ 
answer for the negligence of onboard agents.158  In referencing its broad 
maritime jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit was never bound by the 
Barbetta rule and “our experience and new conditions [sometimes] give 
rise to new conceptions of maritime concerns.”159  The Eleventh Circuit 
felt it was time to reject the Barbetta rule based on the circumstances and 
mounting concerns pertaining to this unwavering traditional standard 
safeguarding cruise line companies from onboard medical malpractice 
claims.160 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that new conditions gave rise to 
“new conceptions and maritime concerns” that required a shift in the 
relevant legal standard.161  At the turn of the century, passenger vessels 
were being used to transport people from one land mass to another and 
doctors brought aboard to treat seafaring passengers were not as 
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prevalent.162  Today, however, cruise ship owners are benefiting from this 
same protection despite operating “state-of-the-art cruise ships that house 
thousands of people and operate as floating cities.”163 
The Eleventh Circuit took issue with applying the Barbetta rule when 
ships are being used as traveling vacation resorts “complete with well-
stocked modern infirmaries and urgent care centers” rather than 
transporting individuals sprawled across the deck.164  Additionally, where 
ships at the turn of the century would essentially disappear after leaving 
port, modern technology allows for ships to be in constant contact 
anywhere in the world.165  For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit stated 
the Barbetta rule is used more as tradition than for “the strength of its 
reasoning” and that “[t]he reasons that originally led other courts to adopt 
the rule have long since disappeared.”166 
While the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the requirement that a claimant 
must show that the ship owner represented the doctor as its agent and that 
the passenger relied on the representation to his or her detriment; the 
Franza decision made the burden of proof easy to satisfy.167 Essentially, 
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that vicarious liability may be imposed 
under apparent authority when a ship owner’s conduct, or subsequent 
inaction, can equitably prevent it from “denying the existence of an agency 
relationship.”168  Therefore, a passenger bringing suit alleging medical 
malpractice must establish these elements as well as facts that prove the 
carrier had control over the treating physician or onboard medical staff.169 
In Franza, the factors considered as “probative” of control in the 
context of maritime respondeat superior (or apparent authority) were: 
 
1.  Direct evidence of the principal’s right to or actual 
exercise of control; 
2.  The method of payment for an agent’s services, 
whether by time or by the job; 
3. Whether or not the equipment necessary to perform the 
work is furnished by the principal; and 
                                                                                                                                     
 162 See O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (1891) (noting that a treating 
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4.  Whether the principal had the right to fire the agent.170 
Importantly, the entire medical staff were considered members of the 
ship’s crew and were paid directly by Royal Caribbean.171  Additionally, 
Royal Caribbean paid for the supplies and all medical equipment aboard 
the vessel.172 
After analyzing the circuit split, it has become clear that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rationale in Franza should provide guidance for the other circuits 
in the future because far from solely transporting passengers from one 
location to another, modern cruise ships have become floating resorts 
attracting vacationers for onboard enjoyment.173  Drifting from traditional 
maritime practices to the more modern tourist industry has caused some 
confusion with how to apply maritime precedent since increasing business 
also brings along additional liabilities.  Cruise ships are not vessels 
engaged in maritime shipping, nor the sort of vessel incorporated by 
nineteenth century protections from respondeat superior and thus, not 
protected by the Barbetta rule. 
The Barbetta rule was established to protect shipping vessels from 
liability when a third-party passenger was injured.174  At the turn of the 
century, when a non-crew member was injured, a crew member or 
someone brought aboard to assist the crew would render treatment.175  The 
court-made rule then became: ship owners cannot be held vicariously 
liable for negligent treatment because there was no duty to those third 
party passengers.176  The rationale was that to impute vicarious liability 
would result in a refusal to treat injured individuals at a time when ships 
were isolated from the rest of world while out at sea.177 
None of these characteristics or concerns can be attributed to modern 
cruise ships.  As a practical matter, cruise ships are not in the business of 
“shipping” nor qualify as shipping vessels.  Rather cruise ship owners used 
their fleet of ships to take passengers around the ocean to enjoy a vacation 
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and then back to the home port.178  Instead of transporting passengers to 
their new homes across the ocean,179  cruise ships are essentially floating 
hotels that carry passengers on a week-long vacation before returning 
home. 
Essentially all cruise lines have pledged to adhere to the ACEP’s 
guidelines on medical staffing and all other requirements.180  Since these 
companies have agreed to such mandates it has become apparent that 
cruise lines have agreed to employ a medical physician for more than just 
the “convenience of its passengers.”181  Accordingly, cruise ships are not 
traditional shipping vessels bringing aboard a doctor for convenience and 
therefore cannot benefit from traditional protections afforded to shipping 
vessels not in the business of treating passengers.182 
While modern shipping vessels are outside of the purview of this 
Article, this protection against vicarious liability cannot be imputed to 
today’s cruise ships.  The fundamental control elements of the Barbetta 
rule are not satisfied by cruise ships.183  The evidence has shown that these 
physicians aboard are part of the new age of infirmaries.  These medical 
centers house doctors and support staff who utilize the same equipment 
one would find in an ordinary hospital.184  These doctors are provided a 
salary directly from the carrier, bill for treatment under the carrier’s name, 
are provided with all supplies and equipment, and report to higher ranking 
crew members.185  This is more than sufficient to demonstrate that a 
master-servant relationship, which was lacking a century ago, now exists 
in the context of cruise lines.186 
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Going forward, if cruise ship owners continue to engage in the 
practice of offering medical treatment and advertise their adherence to the 
ACEP guidelines, they should expect to find courts less inclined to apply 
the Barbetta rule.  Direct oversight of the actual treatment being rendered 
will never again be the appropriate determination allowing carriers to 
dodge vicarious liability under such circumstances.187  Even so, carriers 
have gone so far as to make public their medical guidelines for potential 
vacationers that dictate the medications that will be distributed (at a 
determined price) and what treatments, including surgeries, the medical 
staff will be on-call to perform.188 
While the exact issue remains to be solved, the recent Eleventh 
Circuit decision has provided the judiciary with the route to take when 
hearing future medical malpractice cases occurring onboard cruise ships.  
The Fifth Circuit applied the Barbetta rule out of tradition rather than 
practicality.189  The elements essential to the nineteenth century maritime 
case law were not present in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star.  More 
importantly, apparent authority allows vacationers to recover for the 
negligent acts of an onboard physician.190  As a doctrine based on the 
underlying facts, it is better aligned to tackle the confusion plagued by 
maritime law on this issue.  The traditional underlying facts that led to the 
nineteenth century courts to establish protections from the doctrine of 
respondeat superior are not present in the cases regarding medical 
malpractice occurring aboard cruise lines.  As such, the circuits must start 
to rely less on the traditional Barbetta rule and more on the facts of the 
underlying case to provide vacationers with the chance to bring a valid 
claim for medical malpractice occurring aboard a cruise ship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When people book cruise ship vacations they are excited to get away 
and enjoy themselves.  But most do not consider the hazards that 
accompany a cruise excursion.  As cruise ship vacations continue to grow 
in popularity, outbreaks of noroviruses and passengers sustaining serious 
injuries will unfortunately become more frequent.191  Even if a future 
                                                                                                                                     
 187 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1233; see also Peltz & Nelson, supra note 135, at 39. 
 188 Carnival, Is There a Doctor on Board?, www.carnival.com/CMS/FAQS/ 
Medical_Services.aspx (last visited April 29, 2016). 
 189 See generally, Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (failing 
to discuss apparent agency and focused almost exclusively on the past decisions from the 
turn of the century). 
 190 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1249. 
 191 See Cruise Market Watch, Growth: Growth of the Cruise Line Industry, 
www.cruisemarketwatch.com/growth/ (last visited April 29, 2016) (providing statistics 
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passenger is cautious, he or she reasonably expects the medical services 
offered aboard the ship will provide proper treatment services.  But what 
cannot be anticipated by passengers is an onboard physician’s mistake of 
negligence.  At the heart of this Comment, a passenger may not have a 
cause of action against the cruise line for a physician’s medical 
negligence.192 
The current circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
presents both Congress and the Supreme Court with an opportunity to 
resolve a conflict 100 years in the making.  Providing a remedy to this 
circuit split will finally bridge the gap between medical malpractice claims 
instituted against a hospital and those brought against a cruise ship 
company.  Additionally, it will prevent future economic and physical harm 
to passengers who suffer injuries due to negligent treatment inside a cruise 
ship’s medical center.  Accordingly, clarifying this discrepancy between 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in favor of the Eleventh Circuit is a unique 
opportunity to create bright-line pleading requirements while ensuring 
passengers aboard cruise ships are adequately protected from otherwise 
latent dangers. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
indicating the significant rise in the amount of passengers carried worldwide and the 
additional cruise ships built in recent years to meet this demand). 
 192 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean, 772 F.3d 1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014). 
